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K Y B E R N E T I K A — V O L U M E 10 (1974). N U M B E R 5 
Types of Preference 
LADISLAV TONDL 
The paper presents a semantical analysis of various types of preference on the base of proba-
bilistic and value evaluations. 
. . . pour juger de ce que l'on doit faire pour obtenir un bien ou pour éviter un mal, il ne faut 
pas seulement considérer le bien et le mal en soi, mais la probabilité qu'il arrive ou n'arrive 
pas; et regarder géométriquement la proportion que toutes ces choses ont ensemble ... 
Logique de Port-Royal 
1. THE ROLE OF PREFERENCE AND PREFERENCE ORDERING 
Questions concerning the formal status of preference relations have been raised in 
several scientific domains. It is a known fact e.g. that applications of the means and 
models of the statistical decision theory or the game theory are based on the sup-
position that there exist possible subjects of decision or game which are able to 
evaluate the considered alternatives trom a point of view of relevant preference 
ordering. A preferential scheme also forms the base for any rational decision (in the 
Bayesian sense). This is also the reason why we find various systems of axioms or 
postulates in books or papers explaning the mathematical models of decision which 
must be satisfied by a rationally constructed preference relationship.* The construc-
* A suitable example of such a minimal system of axioms is mentioned by R. D. Luce and 
H. Raiffa [7]. The concept of preference based on the conbination of probability measure and 
desirability measure was introduced by R. C. Jeffrey [5]. A preferential ordering based on the 
distance measure was constructed by J. G. Kemeny and J. L. Snell [6]. It would be possible, of 
course, to mention other examples. 
tion of preferential schemes is important in other domains: A good example can be 
found in modern prognostics. Prognostics today requires more than just pointing 
out the probability distribution of possible future states; it also requires the present 
and especially the future desirability of these states. This means the connection of 
these possible or expected future states with a certain system of values, criteria and 
preferences. Sometimes it is even required that prognostics should put emphasis on 
this sphere of values, decision criteria and preferences. Another domain in which the 
problems of preferences or preference schemes must be taken into consideration is 
data processing, data retrieval for various purposes or informatics. 
We assume that a unique preference scheme does not and cannot exist. In works 
and papers concerning the statistical decision theory we usually find a conception 
describing preference relation as a binary relation between objects of any nature that 
can be compared on the basis of a certain evaluation. It is suitable to distinguish 
preference (which could be considered as a justification of decision) and the proper 
decision or choice of one alternative from the set of possible alternatives. Therefore 
it is sometimes stressed that preference indicates only a possible choice.* This 
assertion cannot be interpreted to mean that any decision or choice is a realized 
proference. It should be taken into consideration that decision can be accidental, 
irrational, motivated by other (and for observer unknown) preferences etc. 
It is not possible to consider the relation between preference and preference 
ordering on the one hand and the decision or any other choice on the other hand as 
equivalence relation. The same reservation concerns the relation between preference 
ordering and a certain form of evaluation which can render a justification of the given 
preference. Nevertheless such an approach, i.e. the reconstruction of preference 
ordering on the basis of evaluation, is quite usual, even though it leads to some 
difficulties as we shall attempt to demonstrate in further explanations. The nature of 
these difficulties is found in the presupposition of substitution possibility — salva 
veritate — of the preference relation and of the evaluation which is able to render 
a justification of the given preference. This presupposition can be expressed in the 
simplest form as follows: 
(1) xPy[^} w(x) > w(y) , 
where P is the preference relation, x and y are preferable entities, w is the evaluation 
function assigning some (numerical) values to these entities and [ = ] is a relation with 
the properties of equivalence relation. 
This approach is based on a simple application of the function w without taking 
into account the probability measure assignable to the entities x and y. This means 
e.g. that we do not take into consideration the likelihood of x and y or the chance 
that these entities might occur or any other probability measures. It is known that 
* E. g. H. S. Houthakker [3]. 
exactly this was demanded by the famous Cartesian logic (Logique de Port-Royal) 
which was conceived as ,,1'art de penser". If p denotes such a probability measure 
which is supposed to fulfil the usual axioms of the probability theory, (l) can be 
transformed into the following notation: 
(2) XPy[ = ]w(x)p(x)>w(y)p(y). 
In the case that x and y exhaust all possible alternatives and represent the com-
plementary possibilities and thatp(x) has the value r, then (2) has the following shape: 
(3) xPy[ = ]w(X)r>W(y)(l-r). 
It is therefore expedient to distinguish three different spheres among them the rela-
tions with properties of equivalence relation are interpolated: 
(a) The sphere of proper decisions or choices between various alternatives. It is 
useful to suppose that this sphere is observable or that it has the nature of a behavior-
type which can be objectively registered or reliably reconstructed on the basis of 
ascertained effects of the chosen alternatives. 
(b) The sphere of preferences which can be reconstructed as a relational system 
between various alternative entities. This system can indicate, as was stressed earlier, 
the possible decision or possible choice if it is, of course, desirable that the decision 
or the choice must be justified by preferences. 
(c) The sphere of evaluations which is conceived as simple or probability weighted 
evaluations or evaluations relativized to certain aims, criteria or postulates. It is 
desirable that these evaluations be expressed in numerical form or at least in a form 
anabling the complete ordering of the entities which are subjected to an evaluation. 
The interpolation of equivalence relation between those, in principle different 
spheres, is connected with efforts to utilize the supposed interdependencies whose 
simplest notations are (1), (2) and (3) for reconstruction and justification of different 
steps in the above mentioned spheres. The most usual procedure of this justification 
can be expressed as follows: (c) => (b) => (a). It is, of course, possible to object that 
this justification is "built on the head" and that other reconstructions are also justified, 
e.g. in the form (a) => (b) => (c). In the following text we shall try to show that such 
a reconstruction has its limits (especially the presupposition of the interpolation of 
the equivalence relations which is able to demonstrate a certain ordering in one 
sphere by means of a corresponding ordering in the other sphere). In some cases 
these limits will be manifested by the interpretation possibility of the corresponding 
matrixes in only one direction and not inversely as it would be desirable in the case 
of equivalence relations and symmetrical dependencies.* 
* This means that the operation which is interpolated between various spheres has the charac-
ter of a connective but not an adjunctive operation in the Reichenbach sense [8]. A logical 
operation is, according Reichenbach, connective if the corresponding matrix can be interpreted 
only in a certain direction, and adjunctive if the sequence of interpretation is not decisive. 
2. THE COMPARABILITY PRINCIPLE AS A PRESUPPOSITION 
OF RECONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE SYSTEM 
The sentences (l), (2) and (3) or any other analogical sentences indirectly express 
the postulate which is usually characterized as the comparability principle.* If we 
use as a base the sentence (l) then the comparability principle means that one of the 
following possibilities is realizable: 
w(x) > w(y), 
w(x) < w(y), 
w(x) = w(y) . 
It should be stressed that these possibilities express the comparability principle 
indirectly, i.e. express the comparability principle in the sphere (b) by means of (c). 
Moreover it is supposed that the corresponding evaluation is conceived in numerical 
form, i.e. is mapped in the set of real numbers. But this presupposition involves some 
difficulties connected with the discrimination limits, with the limited application of 
the density principle etc. 
Because of this it is more useful to express the comparability principle only in 
sphere (b). For the present we shall put aside the problem of the nature of arguments 
in the relation xPy. (In the following explanation we shall try to show that for the 
logical interpretation of the preference relation the interpretation of these arguments 
as denotations of statements or proposition-like-entities or other analogical entities 
is more suitable.**) From the intuitive point of view we can take as comparable those 
entities from the class of all considered entities 9S that have at least one common 
property. It is moreover desirable that this property be assignable in various degrees 
which can be discriminated. If the predicate C denotes such a property, then the sub-
class (%) Cx ((x) Cx cr 3C) is comparable. C can be, e.g., interpreted so that all elements 
of the class (x) Cx are connected with various expenceses, gaines or losses, render 
certain advantages, are products of activity connected with certain effects ete. 
If C denotes a property which can be designed to all the elements of a given class 
in various degrees then it is possible (with respect of any arbitrary pair of elements) 
to decide if this property can be assigned in a higher or lower or equal degree. If the 
preference relation is relativized to C we can construct a very elementary form of 
a preference system by means of the pair <PC, Jc> where Pc is the preference relation 
with respect to C and.Jc the indifference relation (or value coincidence) with respect 
to C. 
* Seee. g. S. Hallden [1]. 
** One of the pioneers of preference logic G. H. von Wright speaks of proposition-like-entities 
112] [13]. 
The properties of P c and Ic are expressed by the following requirements: 
(R 1) (Vx) (Vy) (Vz) [(xPcy . yPcz) - xPcz] , 
(R 2) (Vx) (Vy) {xlcy -> [~(xP cy) v ~(yPcx)]} , 
(R 3) (Vx) (Vy) (*Pcy v x/ cy v yPcx) , 
(R 4) (Vx) (xlcx), 
(R5) ( V x ) ( V y ) ( x / c y - y / c x ) , 
(R 6) (Vx) (Vy) (Vz) [(xlcy . ylcz) -> x/ cz] . 
The requirement (R 3) can be interpreted as an expression of the comparability 
principle. It is obvious that P c is transitive (R 1), /-reflexive (R 2) and that Ic is re-
flexive (R 4), symmetrical (R 5) and transitive (R 6). On the basis of the mentioned 
requirements (or axioms) we can formulate various theorems, e.g. 
(Vx) (Vy) (Vz) [(xPcy . ylcz) -» xP cz] , 
(Vx) (Vy)(xP c y->~yP c x) , etc. 
The pair <PC, Jc> realizes a quasi-serial order in the class (x) Cx <= $" and the 
preference relation has all the properties of comparative predicates.* 
The procedure used for the justification of the comparability principle was based 
on the presupposition that a preference system is realizable in the class 1 or in 
a subclass of this class provided that a common property C (discernible in degree) 
can be fixed so that 
(x) Q c f 
and 
(x) Cx 4= 0 . 
The comparability principle can be connected with a somewhat different meaning. 
If a common property C is unknown but the entities forming the given class are 
comparable, then the comparability can indicate that there is one or more common 
properties assignable to all entities of the given class. A similar consideration formed 
the base for the known Marx's procedure leading to the introduction of the concept 
"value" (in the economic sense). It is also possible to introduce a binary relation K 
defined as follows: 
xKy = xPy v yPy v xly . 
It can be proved that this relation is symmetrical, reflexive and transitive. 
* The analysis of comparative predicates and the reconstruction of a quasi-serial order is 
explained in [11]. 
From the theoretical point of view we could suppose further interpretations of the 
comparability principle. We shall start with the following question: If we are able 
(in the class 9C with a common property) to prefer x before y, can we always expect 
to be able to find such a z that z could be interpolated between x and y in the given 
preference system? In other words, is it justified to assert that 
(Vx) (V>>) (3z) (xPy . xPz . zPy) ? 
It seems that this is not possible in all circumstances: First, it should be stressed 
that the class of entities could be finite so that it is impossible to find a z with the 
mentioned properties. Furthermore it holds that any proference discrimination is 
connected with certain limits of discriminability. This means that the preference 
distance between x and y can be so insignificant that no other entity could be inter-
polated between x and y in such a manner that this entity could be discriminated 
from x and y in the preference order. What is merely guaranted is the following: If 
there is a z such that 
z e (x) Cx , 
it holds that 
(4) xPcy -* (xPcz v zPcy). 
It is obvious that this expression which could be called a comparability principle in 
the narrow sense does not exclude 
xlcz v ylcz . 
In this connection a possibility is offered to modify the system of requirements 
(R 1) — (R 6) so that these requirements would involve the comparability principle in 
the narrow sense. But the comparability principle in the narrow sense is valid only 
if xPcy and if there exist a z which is an element of (x) Cx. Because of this it is not 
possible to accept 
(5) (Vx) (V>0 (3Z) [XPCJ; - (xPcz v zPcy)] . 
Also because of this it is not possible to substitute (R 5) by the expression (5) and this 
modification is not passable. 
3. PREFERENCE OF THINGS AND PREFERENCE 
OF STATES OF AFFAIRS 
Upto now we have considered the preference concept as a two-placed predicate 
whose arguments are not specified entities. This conception can be characterized as 
preference of things and obviously has a very limited application. Moreover this 
conception does not correspond to the intuitive interpretation of preference which is 
evident from the following examples: If we ask whether a peaceful coexistence is 395 
better than war, then the preference concerns states of affairs. Moreover it is possible 
to realize the preference relation between a state of affairs and a negation of this state 
asking, e.g. if it is more advantageous in the present period that it is raining or that it 
is not raining. It seems to be sure that the majority uses of the preference relationship 
in common sense language has the character of preference of states of affairs more that 
of preference of things. Assuming that we prefer a family house to a tenament house 
we understand thereby that we prefer living in a family house to living a tenament 
house. 
The conception of the preference relationship as preference of states of affairs, of 
course, changes the logical status of preference. As arguments of preference relation 
are taken entities which can be characterized as states of affairs or proposition-like-
entities [13]. This conception of preference relation is supported by most authors 
studying the logic of preference. N. Rescher speaks e.g. on prepositional preference 
ordering [10, p. 292]. The expression pPq is then understood to mean that the states 
of affairs denoted by p have preference before the states of affairs denoted by q. It is 
obvious that the meaning of the sign P is somewhat different from the meaning of P 
used as a comparative predicate. It should be stressed that the expression pPq does 
not state the preference relation between p and q taken as statements or sentences, 
i.e. the preference between the linguistic forms, but it states the preference between 
states of affairs or possible or alternative facts denoted by p and q. Since any state 
of affairs can be taken as realized or not realized, we must suppose positive and 
negative instances of states of affairs. (For the negative instances we shall use the 
sign ~ . ) Then the expression 
pP~ p 
means that the state of affairs denoted by p is preferable before the negation of the 
state denoted by ~ p. 
If we consider as arguments of the preference relation states of affairs or otherwise 
characterized proposition-like-entities, we have to admit as arguments denotations 
of molecular expressions, e.g. 
(P • r) Pq , 
(p.~q)P(~p.q), 
pP(q v r) , 
etc. 
The fact that arguments of a preference relation are formed not only by atomic 
expressions but also by negations and molecular expressions leads to the new claims 
on the concept of preference. Difficulties raised in this connection concern especially 
the possibilities the sphere of evaluations (i.e. the sphere (c)). If it holds e.g. that 
pPq, 
396 then it is obvious that this implies 
<qPp). 
If we put w(p) = A and w(q) = B, then 
pPq [ = ] A > B , 
p/g [ = ] 4 = B . 
In various systems of preference logic is mostly accepted as valid,* i.e. as axioms 




pPq^ ~qP ~ p, 
PPq-*(p. ~q)P(~p.q), 
j q P „ p-+(p. ~q)P(~p.q). 
These sentences are valid e.g. in the system of preference logic elaborated by S. 
Hallden [ l ] whose preference system A is introduced by the following axioms: 
(A 1) pPq - ~(qPp), 
(A 2) pPq . qPr -» pPr, 
(A3) pip, 
(A 4) plq -> qlp, 
(A 5) plq . qlr -> plr, 
(A 6) pPq-+(p.~q)P(~p.q), 
(A 7) plq-*(p.~q)l(~p.q). 
It is obvious that (6), (7) and (8) are axioms or theorems in this system of preference 
logic. 
If we write down now the values of the evaluation function n>(s;) where s ; is the 






* Only Chisholm and Sosa [4] reject sentences (6), (7) and (8) as inacceptable, but the reason 
of this rejection is incoherent with the evaluation sphere, but is justified by their hedonistic 
conception of preferability. 
we should always obtain as valable that 
if A > B , then D > C . 




~p - 2 
~<7 - 4 
which evidently does not satisfy the above mentioned requirement. It also means that 
the suppesed equivalence relation interpolated between the sphere (b) and (c) which 
should guarantee the mutual correspondance of decisions in both spheres is violated. 
If we take into consideration as arguments of preference relation molecular expres­
sions, the correspondance of sphere (b) and sphere (c) is more sophisticated. We can 




~ p C 
~q D 
(П) 
p . q 
p . ~ < / 
"P • <7 
-p.~<7 
i ф ; ) 
If we accept sentences (7) and (8) as axioms or theorems of a preference system it 
would be desirable that the following be valid: 
and 
if A > B, then fa > c 
if D > B, then b > c . 
It is, of course, obvious that there are no a priori guarantees for this. 
Another problem raised herewith is the question whether the values of the evalua­
tion function in scheme (1) can be determinated independently from those in scheme . 
(II) and vice versa. Which of the mentioned schemes can be taken as the initial 
scheme? 
An answer to these questons was presented by N. Rescher [9] [10]. It can be shown 
that this solution involves the calculation of values in scheme (I) on the basis of scheme 
(II), in other words, table (II) must be considered as initial. In the opposite case the 
problem is not solvable. Therefore constraints are given for the acceptance of sen-
tences (6), (7) and (8) or of other analogical expressions. (This concerns e.g. the 
expression 
plq - * ( p . ~q)l(~p.q) 
etc.) Rescher's approach leads to the conclusion that only one concept of preference 
is not sufficient. Therefore Rescher presents two different concepts of preference. 
The justification of Rescher's conception is based on semantics: If p, q, r, ..., etc. 
are atomic propositions, then we must suppose that for any atomic or molecular 
proposition there exists a set of states of affairs or of possible worlds (in the Leibnizian 
sense) or a set of denotations of admissible state descriptions (in the sense of Carnap). 
Having a triplet of propositions p, q, r and taking into account only those proposi-
tions and their negations, then the proposition p would correspond to possible state 
descriptions which can be expressed as the disjunction 
p . q . r v p . q • ~r v p . ~q . r v p . ~q . ~r . 
On this semantical base Rescher introduces two different concepts of preference. 
The preference denoted by P* is based on the average (arithmetical mean) of the 
values of those possible worlds involved by the used propositions. The expression 
pP*q is true if the average value of the possible worlds involved in p is higher than 
the average value of the possible worlds involved in q. (It should be stressed that this 
approach does not solve the evaluation of a contradiction.) For the sake of simplicity 
we shall suppose only four possible worlds with evaluations: 
possible worlds: p. q their evaluations: a 
p . ~q b 
~p. q c 
~p. ~q d 
The evaluation of p based on this approach and denoted by wi>(p) is formed by the 
average of evaluations of two possible worlds denoted by p . q and p . ~q, i.e. 





q + c 
2 
c + d 
2 
b + d 
Reseller's conception supposes that all possible worlds are equally probable. But 
it is useful — as was the case with the probabilization of Carnapian state descrip­
tions — to suppose that various possible worlds are not equally probable. Therefore 
we shall introduce a weighted evaluation which corresponds to the above mentioned 
requirement of Cartesian logic. This is shown in the following scheme (where 
-i + r2 + r 3 + r 4 = 1): 
possible worlds or probability of the genuine evaluation weighted evaluation 
states of affairs statepO;) w{st) p(Sf) И>(í,) 
P • г i e l rŁ . e t = a 
P • ~<7 Г 2 Є 2 r2.e2= b 
~p • q Г 3 e 3 r 3 . e 3 = c 
~p.~q Г 4 e 4 r 4 e 4 = d 
If it holds that 
it follows that 
w\p) = A, 
w\q) =B, 
»\~p) = C, 
w\~q) = D 
A = a + b , 
B = a + c, 
C = c + d, 
D= b + d. 
It can be easily shown that this approach does not impose any restriction on the 
evaluations of the possible worlds or states of affairs if this evaluation is taken as an 
initial. This means that A, B, C, D are calculable provided that a, b, c, d are given. 
These constraints can be expressed by the following relations: 
A + C=B + D (i.e. w*(p) + w\~p) = w\q) + w*(~q)) 
A + c = B + b , 
D + c = C + b. 
If we establish evaluations schemes for the possible worlds or states of affairs on 
the one hand and the evaluation scheme of atomic propositions on the other hand, 
we can read the correspondance of these schemes in one direction only. This fact 
400 represents a certain analogy of connective operations as opposed to adjunctive 
operations which allow for interpretations in both directions.* 
Similar consequences are obtained by the analysis of the second preference concept 
which Rescher denotes by P*. If we take as a base the mentioned scheme of weighted 
evaluation we can introduce evaluation corresponding to P* so that we take into 
consideration not only the weighted evaluation of the possible worlds involved in 
the used propositions, but also the weighted evaluation of those worlds excluded in 
the used propositions, according to the following rule: 
W*(S) = W>*(S;) - w\~S,). 
Since s; and ~ s ; are complementary and involve the whole universe it also holds that 
w*(s) + w*(~Si) = 0 . 
The constraints corresponding to P* are then expressed by the following relations: 
w*(p) = A = a + b - c - d , 
w*(q) = B = o - b + c - d , 
w*(~p) = C = - o - b + c + d , 
w*(~q) = D = - o + b - c + d . 
It follows then that 
A + C = 0 , i.e. w*(p) + w*(~p) = 0 , 
B + D = 0 , i.e. w*(q) + w*(~q) = 0 . 
It can easily be shown that both preference concepts, i.e. P* and P* satisfy, when the 
above mentioned connective interpretation of corresponding schemes is respected, 
sentences (6), (7) and (8). 
4. PREFERENCE "CETERIS PARIBUS" 
Till now we have distinguished two concepts of preference. The first one denoted 
by P* could be characterized as the concept of involving preference, the second one 
denoted by P* as the concept of differential preference. Of course not all possible 
and used conceptions of preference have been exhausted. Let us confront the fol-
lowing preference statements: 
(a) It is better to have a sparrow in the hand than a pigeon on the roof. 
(P) I prefer tea to coffee at all meals. 
* The distinction of adjunctive and connective operations was introduced by H. Reichenbach 
[8]. 
The preference statement (a) is an example of a relativised preference, statement 401 
(P) is an example of preference cateris paribus. Relativized preference represents 
a preference ordering of two components which are under different circumstances. 
Preference ceteris paribus is a preference ordering of two components under all 
concidered circumstances. From the concept of preference ceteris paribus we can 
distinguish another type of preference which can be described as preference under 
explicity determined circumstances, e.g. 
(y) I prefer tea to coffee with an English breakfest of ham, eggs, cheese and toast. 
In common sense language the differences between (P) and (y) need not be clearly 
and exactly distinguishable which is likewise evident on the basis of the above 
mentioned examples (P) and (y). Because of this and for the sake of higher exactness 
we shall introduce a schematic example: Suppose that we have to ascertain the 
preference order between p and q provided that other components r and t must be 
taken into consideration. Then the possible states of affairs or the possible worlds 
can be demonstrated by the following scheme which also involves the weighted 
evaluation: 







1 0 1 
1 0 0 
0 1 1 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 
0 1 1 0 
0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
If we denote the preference ceteris paribus by Pcp and preference under the 
explicitely determined circumstances by Pcc, we obtain using the evaluation func-
tion w*: 
Ppcp<l [ = ] w\ss v 56 v s7 v s8) > w\sg v s10 v sx l v s12) 
[ = ] («5 + °6 + O7 + Og) > (o9 + O10 + a., + 012) . 
It should be noted that we could also use the differential evaluation w*, but this use 
leads to the equivalent solution. Therefore we need not distinguish the involving 
preference ceteris paribus and the differential preference ceteris paribus. Using w* 
we obtain 
PPcPq [ = ] ( - « i - °2 - «*3 ~ 04 + o5 + "e + "7 + "s - 09 - °io - On -
- 01 2 - 01 3 - 01 4 - 015 - 016) > (-Oj: - o2 - o3 - o4 -
- °5 - °6 - °7 - °8 + °9 + °10 + °11 + °12 - Q13 - °14 ~ 
- " i s - - i 6 ) 
which is equivalent with the above mentioned expression. 
The concept of preference under the explicitely determined circumstances sup-
poses that further components are explicitely determined. If it is determined that 
preference relation between p and q has to be fixed under the circumstances r. ~t, 
then 
pPccq {ec = r . ~i) [ = ] w*(p . ~q . r . ~t) > w"(~p . q . r . ~t) 
[ = ] o 6 > o1 0 
It should also be added that here the use of w* is connected with the equivalent 
results so that the distinction between involving and differential concept of preference 
under the explicitely determined circumstances is not needed. 
We shall now notice one important property of preference under the explicitely 
determined circumstances. While expressions 
pP'q -qP*P, 
pP*q . qP*p 
and 
pPcpq . qPcvp 
are to be considered as inconsistent, there is no justification to consider as inconsistent 
the following expression 
pP^q • qP^p, 
if e.g. in the above mentioned expression 
ec1 = r . ~t 
and 
ec2 = ~ r . t 
and if it holds that 
o6 > o1 0 and at the same time axl > a7 . 
From the logical point of view it is important to notice that the preference ceteris 
paribus, and likewise the preference under the explicitly determined circumstances, the 
involving preference and the differential preference fulfil the sentences (6), (7), (8). 
This, however, does not hold for the relativized preference. What about the relativized 
preference denoted here by P r e ] it may fulfil only (A l) so that 
PPreiq^ ~(qPrelP), 
but it is hardly possible that the relativized preference is transitive and moreover can 
fulfil the sentences (6), (7), (8). It is also natural that the relativized preference is 
irreflexive so that it holds: 
~(pPrelP) • 
It is obvious that the relativized preference satisfies only very minimal claims and 
therefore it would be wrong to take the relativized preference as a starting point 
for the construction of preference systems. 
5. THE CONCEPT OF "PREFERABLE STATES OF AFFAIRS" 
AS QUALITATIVE CONCEPT 
Upto now we have distinguished five concepts of preference. The majority of them 
(with the exception of relativized preference) had preperties of comparative concepts, 
i.e. are irreflexive, assymmetrical and transitive. Since comparative concepts are in 
the logical methodology construed as a superstructure in a domain of qualitative 
concepts which enable the assignment of a certain quality discernible in degree, 
a concept of preferability may be supposed which would correspond to qualitative 
concepts. In logical systems of preference it is quite usual to introduce qualitative 
concepts based on the concept of preference or on the concept of indifference, 
respectively. Thus a triplet of qualitative concepts can be introduced: 
Bp (the state denoted by p is preferable, i.e. good), 
Mp (the state denoted by p is not preferable, i.e. bad), 
Lp (the state denoted by p is indifferent) 
and defined as follows: 
Bp =pP~p, 
Mp = ~pPp, 
Lp = pi ~ p . 
This procedure is used by S. Hallden [ l ] and von Wright in his first study [12]. 
Because of very similar reasons von Wright consders the following expression as 
a tautology: 
(9) (pP~p).(~qPq)^(pPq) 
which can be interpreted as follows: If p is preferable and q unpreferable, then we 
must prefer p to q. 
The difficulties cennected with (9) are, of course, quite evident, if we put for 
w(p), w(q), w(~p) and w(~q) as in the above mentioned schemes A, B, C, D. Then 
we should accept as valid 
(10) [(A>C).(D>B)]->(A>B). 
If A, B, C, D are real numbers we have undoubtedly no a priori guarrantee to 
consider (10) as tautology. If e.g. 
A = 5, B = 6, C = 4, D = 7, 
it is obvious that (10) and thereby (9) are not valid. In order to make this expression 
acceptable it is not possible to take any concept of preference as initial, but only 
a certain type of preference and thereby the corresponding constraints for A, B, C, D. 
It can be shown that (9) is satisfied provided that P is interpreted as involving 
preference, i.e. as P*. Then it holds that 
A+ C = D + B 
and (10) is acceptable. Likewise the concept of differential preference P* satisfies (9) 
since it holds that 
A + C = 0 
and 
B + D = 0 . 
Contrariwise the concept of preference ceteris paribus does not satisfy (9) because 
if it held that 
l(pP*P~p).(~qPepq)~]^(pPcPq), 
it should also have held, using the above mentioned scheme with 16 possible states 
on the basis of components p, q, r, t, that 
{[(°1 + °2 + °3 + °4 + °5 + °6 + °7 + 08) > (°9 + °10 + 
+ "ii + -12 + fli3 + -14 + °is + "le)] • [("i + a2 + a3 + a4 + 
+ o9 + oI0 + o u + o12) > (o5 + a6 + o7 + o8 + o13 + o14 + 
+ "15 + Oie)]} - K°5 + «6 + °7 + °8) > («9 + -10 + Oil +
 013)] . 
for which, of course, no a priori guarrantee is given. 
In contradistinction to the concept of preference ceteris paribus the concept of 
preference under explicitly determined circumstances satisfies (9). If we take in the 
used scheme 
ec = r . ~ t, 
we obtain 
[(°6 > °io) • (a6 > -10)] -* (°e > a io) 
which is evidently a tautology. 
We may conclude that the corresponding qualitative concepts, i.e. concepts of 
preferable, unpreferable and indifferent states of affairs can be introduced on the 
basis of preference concepts only if some of the constraints are accepted. From the 
above introduced concepts of preference involving preference, differential preference 
and preference under the explicitly determined circumstances can be used as such 
a base. 
The sentence (9) corresponds, at first sight, to the trivial requirement that good 
states of affairs are preferable to bad states of affairs. But this problem is more 
complicated, since the used qualitative concepts are not primitive, but concepts 
defined on the basis of preference concepts, which take into account the mentioned 
constraints. From the intuitive point of view the most favourable concept is the 
concept of differential preference taken as the initial one: As far as this concept is 
concerned it holds that the sum of evaluations connected with complementary states 
is always equal to zero, i.e. that for any st 
w*(s,-) + w*(~st) = 0. 
It should be added that this approach and this justification of preference correspond 
to such a mode of deliberation where any choice from the set of possible alternatives 
calculates both with the sum of gains and likewise with the sum of losses. It is un-
necessary to think of the concept of gain or loss only in the economic or financial 
sense. Then a certain simplification of the mentioned definitions of B, M, and Lis 
possible: 
Bp [ = ]w*(p)>Q, 
Mp[ = ]w*(p) < 0 , 
Lp [ = ]w*(p) = 0. 
6. PREFERENCE AS A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE 
The expression pPq, no matter what type of preference - the fore mentioned or 
other types — is taken into consideration, represents in fact a certain simplification: 
This expression is an impersonal and untemporal modification of the following expres-
sion: "x in the time t prefers p to q". Because of this it seems to be suitable to relativize 
preference expressions to a certain subject and to a certain time. 
Since arguments of the relation P are states of affairs or denotations of prositions 
(in all the above mentioned types of preference) it is expedient to consider P as 
a special form of a propositional attitude or as a special epistemic-modal operator. 
As propositional attitudes we usually regard statements like 
x believes that p , 
x knows that p , 
x doubts p , etc. 
Logical theory of propositional attitudes or epistemic-modal operators was 
elaborated in details in many systems of asserton logic or epistemic logic* One of the 
characteristic features of the propositional attitudes is the non-extensional contextual 
concatenation of the operator and of the proposition itself, which brought these 
problems closer to the problems of various systems of modal logic. In contradistinction 
to the usual epistemic-modal operators which fix a certain attitude of the speaker to 
one proposition or to an interpretation (usually denotation) of one proposition, the 
preference expression involves the attitude of the speaker to the donotation of two 
propositions or, in other words, to a certain preference ordering of the propositions. 
Likewise as in the other cases of propositional attitudes the temporal specification 
is not without importance for preference expressions. The change of temporal speci-
fication can lead to changes in the preference attitudes of the given speaker. Because 
of similar reasons the following concatenation of two different preference attitudes 
of the same speaker need not be considered as inconsistent: "x prefers at the time t p 
to q and x prefers at the time t' (different from i) q to p" . It can not be excluded that 
the value system of the speaker x can be subjected to changes in the interval between t 
and t'. If we write down the speaker of the preference attitude and the temporal 
determination of this attitude as indexes of P (no matter which interpretation of the 
sign P is chosen), then the following expressions are to be considered as consistent: 
pPXttq . qPxxV (provided that t #= t') 
or 
pPx>tq . qPyttp (provided that x #= y). 
Regarding the preference as a special form of the propositional attitude (therefore 
we speak about preference attitudes) we must take into account that as speakers or 
subjects of preference attitudes we can admit not real persons but also legal persons, 
certain groups of persons (e.g. voters of the given electoral domain etc.). Then 
a manifestation system of preference attitudes is needed (e.g. choice of one of possible 
alternatives, decision of the corresponding authorities representing the legal person, 
* The problem of propositional attitudes was already mentioned in Whitehead's and Russell's 
Principia Mathematica and later in Carnap's Meaning and Necessity. In the last period new 
interesting conceptions of a logical theory of the propositional altitudes were presented by J. 
Hintikka [2] and N. Rescher [10]. 
electoral system etc.). As a subject of a preference attitude we can also imagine 
a constructive entity, e.g. an ideal rational being, a Bayesian robot considered by 
R. C. Jeffrey [5]. An assertion that such beings do not exist in reality does not exclude 
the possibility of reconstructing the preference attitudes of such beings. 
Because of similar reasons some authors considered the distinction between the 
concept of "preference" and the concept of "preferability" as reasonable (e.g. von 
Wright in his last paper [13]). The concept of "preferability" or "preferable" can be 
thought of as "being reasonably better than" or as preference attitude of an ideal 
being or similarly. Therefore statements of preferability need not be realitivized to 
a certain person and time. Since preference attitudes of various persons need not 
coincide with preference attitude of an ideal rational being (denoted here as pBq 
("p is preferable before q"), the espression 
pP.A • qBP 
can be considered as consistent. 
Analysing various preference attitudes and consistency problems of statements 
which express these attitudes we can fix various claims to what is or must be at the 
subject's disposal. If we can, e.g. concede that this subject established his preference 
attitude accordind to a value system different from an ideal or rationaly justified 
value system of a Bayesian robot (in the spirit of the principle "de gustibus non est 
disputandum") we will evidently show less readiness to concede the ignorance of 
logical principles, e.g. the ignorance of contradiction. In the sense of these claims the 
preference expression 
(P • ~P) PA 
will be now considered as evidently inconsistent. This means that from the logico-
semantic point of view we shall be more willing to tolerate the plurality of value 
systems and distinctions between various subjects and less willing to tolerate the 
violation of elementary logical, syntactical and semantical principles valid for the 
linguistic means used in preference expressions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. An analysis of the logical status of preference supports the conception that we 
must distinguish various concepts of preference. Our analysis introduced five con-
cepts: involving preference, differential preference, preference ceteris paribus, 
preference under the explicitly specified circumstances and relativized preference. 
These concepts satisfy in different ways principles considered as tautologies of a pre-
ference calculus. (In our paper we have selected sentences (6), (7), (8), (9).) 
2. As a semantical base of the involving preference we can consider procedures 
corresponding to the stale description method or to Carnap's concept of logical range. 
408 Differential preference corresponds to the procedures used in econometric decisions 
under the supposition of zero sum, i.e. if it holds for any s; that 
w*(s,) + w*(~s;) = 0. 
Preference ceteris paribus reflects all possible circumstances taken into consideration 
at a preference ordering. Since the number of these circumstances can be very large 
it is obvious that the justification of preference on this basis can be very sophisticated. 
Preference under explicitly specified circumstances is evidently the most exact 
starting point of a reliable preference ordering. 
3. Preference expressions can be considered as a special form of propositional 
attitude and the concept of preference itself as a epistemic-modal operator. 
4. Varous types and forms of preference expressions suppose various conditions 
of consistency. The absence of violation of elementary logical, syntactical and seman-
tical rules must be considered as a minimal consistency condition. 
(Received March 13, 1974.) 
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